MANAGERIAL AND PROFESSIONAL EMPLOYEES,
TRADE UNIONS AND INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNALS
IN AUSTRALIA

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In Australia the state encouraged the formation of trade unions and the extension of trade union coverage for most employees. However, governments and tribunals displayed a contradictory attitude to both the registration of trade unions whose members were professional or managerial employees and to the extension of award classifications to these employees. Despite the reluctance to include managerial and professional employees within the arbitration systems, a number of unions with coverage of these employees have been registered. This article has two major parts. First, it examines the impact of governments and industrial tribunals on the role of trade unions in the regulation of managerial and professional employment in the private sector. Second, it examines the characteristics of these trade unions and briefly considers recent developments in their strategies and structures.

A very popular definition for professional and managerial employees refers to those employees who are above the first line level of supervision but below top executive level (Snape and Bamber 1989; Lansbury and Quince 1989). This is the definition used in this study. This group includes employees from a range of starting occupations including engineers, scientists, line managers and those who have moved through clerical positions into high level salaried positions. The term 'managers' is used in the article to refer to this group of diverse employees.

THE STATE AND MANAGERS: A CONTRADICTORY RELATIONSHIP

The state is conceptualised in terms of legislative, judicial and executive components. The executive arm, particularly the federal Industrial Registry and the Industrial Relations Commission (IRC) had restricted the role of the trade unions in determining salaries and conditions for managers during much of the twentieth century. In addition, in three state jurisdictions legislation had limited the role of industrial tribunals in the determination of managerial salaries. However, these limitations were gradually removed during the post war period.

The state's approach to the regulation of managerial employment was not neutral or consistent. The policies preventing third party involvement in the early part of the century indicate the state's role in supporting certain forms of social relations at work. At the same time they indicate inconsistencies in the state's activities. This was most noticeable with regard to the registration and membership coverage of trade unions. On one hand the state sought to foster the development and registration of trade unions, but on the other hand, it did not support union coverage of managers.

Impact of the state on the role of trade unions and tribunals

The state through legislation and tribunal and industrial registry decisions had a profound effect on the role of trade unions and industrial tribunals in the determination of managers' salaries and employment conditions. The state had for many years regarded managerial employees as elite members of the labour market whose interests were synonymous with those of the employers. For many years it was considered inappropriate for industrial tribunals to determine the salaries of managers, and the process was regarded as an area of 'managerial prerogative'. Implied in this view was the belief managers could successfully represent their industrial interests when dealing with their employers. This view institutionalised management practices based on the presumption that managers and their employers shared a commonality of interests which required no intervention from third parties such as trade unions or industrial tribunals. This view, however, changed with economic and social developments.
Legislation

In three state jurisdictions, legislation prevented the state tribunals determining managerial salaries for many years. In Queensland the Salaries Act prevented industrial tribunals determining the salaries of high status employees until 1936 (Whitehouse and Wiltshire 1987: 36), in South Australia the industrial boards were prevented from determining salaries for certain salaried employees until 1956. In New South Wales the Industrial Arbitration Act explicitly prohibited the state industrial tribunal determining the remuneration of "persons occupying managerial positions" in the private sector and high salaried employees until 1953 and 1956 respectively.

The Industrial Arbitration Act did not restrict the role of the tribunals in this regard in New South Wales until 1918. An amendment of section 24 of the Act in 1918 prevented the state industrial court from determining the remuneration of employees earning more than $10 per week or occupying managerial positions. Mr Beeby (Minister for Labour and Industry) claimed

"Some restriction on the jurisdiction of the court is essential. The whole of the commercial and industrial operations of the community irrespective of the nature and class of work done, cannot be brought under industrial tribunals" (New South Wales Parliamentary Debates, Sessions 1917–1918, Legislative Assembly, 13 February 1918: 2464).

This restriction reflected the Court of Industrial Arbitration's interpretation of the legislation made in 1916. The Court had taken the the legislation to imply an upper limit on the wages and salaries it could determine, and they set this limit at $5 per week (New South Wales Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 23 October 1956: 3294).

The amendments to the Industrial Arbitration Act in 1953 and 1956 to remove the restrictions on the Industrial Court resulted from representations to the government from a number of trade unions whose members were affected by the limitation. In 1953 the restrictions applying to managerial employees were removed because the government argued these employees had been denied justice in the process of salary determination. In 1956, the Minister for Housing, Mr Landa argued the removal of the restrictions on high salary earners were necessary for four reasons. First, it would make the practice in New South Wales consistent with the practice in the federal and other state jurisdictions; second, it would accommodate the increasing trend for "professional and other highly paid employees to seek fixation of their wages and other conditions of their employment by arbitration tribunals"; third, it would remove the inconsistencies in having all award conditions of employment other than salary or wages applying to high salary or managerial employees; fourth, it would remove the inconsistency resulting from the ability for trade unions to secure agreements for these employees from employers. The two opposition parties, the Liberal Party and the National Party, supported the amendment claiming it was necessary to remove the anomalies which operated under the existing arrangements when an employee moved beyond the salary limit and became award free (New South Wales Parliamentary Debates 12 November 1953: 3294–3296). Therefore as a result of these amendments managerial and high salaried employees were given the same access to industrial tribunals as other private sector employees.

Federal industrial tribunals

Although there were no legislative requirements prohibiting the involvement of the industrial tribunals in the federal jurisdiction, the Industrial Registrar and the members of the tribunal had restricted the role of third parties in the determination of managerial salaries in three ways. This occurred first, by leaving managerial positions 'award free'; second, not extending salary scales to managers where trade unions had coverage of occupations where some of the members could have been managers; and third, limiting the award coverage of many unions to exclude managerial employees. These restrictions occurred for reasons which reflected tribunal assumptions about the interests of managerial employees. Their interests were assumed to be synonymous with the employer because they exercised control over other employees. This view formed the basis of the reasoning behind the arguments of 'conflict of
loyalties' and the 'management ethic argument' which informed many tribunal decisions regarding managerial employees. However, in some circumstances the tribunal extended award coverage to managers because of custom or because the employers agreed to such coverage. Similarly, the Industrial Registrar registered trade unions whose members included managers, in circumstances where all their members would otherwise have remained outside the federal tribunal's jurisdiction.

The Industrial Relations Commission (previously the Australian Conciliation and Arbitration and the Commonwealth Court of Conciliation and Arbitration) argued against extending union and award coverage to managers, foremen or supervisors because they exercised authority on behalf of their employer (32 CAR 733–35; 15 CAR 1144; 150 CAR 949–950; 52 CAR 271; 194 CAR 582–587). On many occasions the members of the tribunal claimed those exercising authority on behalf of the employer could not belong to trade unions because of the problem of 'divided loyalties' (32 CAR 733–135; 15 CAR 1144; 150 CAR 949–950). This sentiment was expressed by C.J. Dethridge in the A.W.U. and the Woolclassers Association of Australia case when he said

"In many cases, he has the power of engaging and discharging other employees. He has to exercise some superintendence over the manner in which the work of shearing is carried out. He has to represent the owner of the wool in seeing that the shearing is conducted properly without damage to the fleece. In some circumstances, he has to do some book keeping involving the making of entries and the keeping of accounts, in the doing of which he may come into conflict with other employees in the shearing shed. He does that on behalf of the owner of the wool which is being shorn, so that he frequently acts as the employers representative in the carrying on of the work in the shed.

This Court has indicated on several occasions that it is undesirable that employees who have to superintend the work of other employees, and who may have to discipline other employees should be in the same organisation as the employees whom they have to discipline. Quite obviously as it has been put by Justice Powers, it is impracticable for a man to serve two masters. I quite agree that a man in a position of authority would often find it impossible to carry on his work effectively and fairly to his employer if he is being subject to being disciplined by the union because his action in respect of employees over who he has to exercise some control" (32 CAR 733–735).

Justice Kelly conducted similar arguments in the Geelong Woolbrokers Association and the Federated Storemen and Packers Union of Australia (N.S. No. 139 of 1944) when he claimed "... where the promotion or advancement is a sort of managerial or quasi-managerial consequence, or where it involves duties of a disciplinary character involving a real participation in the power to engage or to suspend or dispense with labour or duties protective of employer interests against the possibilities of their being prejudiced by the claims of employees, it is reasonable to allow the employer to adopt the attitude that the employees loyalty to him may be incompatible with loyalty to the union interests of his fellow employees" (52 CAR 271).

At the same time, members of the tribunal argued managers and their employers had a fiduciary and confidential relationship, which gave the employers a prerogative to determine managerial salaries and settle managerial grievances (19 CAR 272; 194 CAR 582–587; 150 CAR 949–950). This attitude therefore excluded managers from the protection offered by the tribunals in the settlement of grievances and determination of salaries.

There were, however, exceptions to the application of these principles in circumstances where there was an universal custom to include managers or those performing the activities of employers in an award or where the employers supported the extension of the award. The first circumstance occurred in the case involving the Australian Theatrical and Amusement Employees Association (ATEA). In this case Mr Deputy President Webb on 12 August 1924 stated
"It is not customary in awards of this Court to make provision for persons in the position of heads of departments but in this industry there has been an universal custom to include them" (20 CAR:18).

The second circumstance occurred in the banking industry in 1923. Mr Justice Quick expressed reservations about extending the award and coverage of an industry union to managers because of the conflict of loyalties and the technical objection involved. However, he extended the award to managers because of the apparent support of the employers. He stated

"...Twelve managers have attended this Court and have given evidence on oath in support of their claims. The banks have met the claims in a calm and business like manner, without any expression of annoyance or any attempt to obstruct or prevent a fair hearing. On the contrary, they have facilitated the granting of leave of absence from duty at the banks to allow the managers and other officials the time and opportunity to attend the Court and prosecuting their claims. Therefore, such claims by the claimants and the reply by the respondents should, I think, be considered by me on the merits apart from the technical objection available" (19 CAR 284-5).

During the 1970's the tribunals modified their attitude towards the extension of award conditions to employees performing managerial duties. Decisions in three cases indicated members of the tribunals believed the principles of 'management ethic' and 'conflict of loyalties' were no longer relevant barriers to the award coverage of managers. It was claimed these principles were developed and reflected the conventions and social relations of a different era. These three cases covered different types of managers in three different industries: stage directors and managers in the theatre industry; supervisors in the metal industry; and high administrative personnel and managers in an university.

In the theatrical industry, award coverage was extended to stage directors and managers in 1973 following Justice Robinson's arguments that award coverage had been extended to other managers in the industry for many years and there was a trend towards the regulation of managers. Justice Robinson stated

"...The traditional reluctance of arbitral tribunals to interfere with the rights of management had its origins in a totally different social, industrial and economic environment. Although restrictions on the level to which regulation should attach are, in the federal jurisdiction, man made and not directed by statute, changes in the New South Wales Industrial Arbitration Act are probably instructive of the general situation... The same trend is evident in the recent decision of Commissioner Portus to regulate hotel managers in the Australian Capital Territory despite the objection that it was not desirable for an award to be made covering hotel managerial staff. In this connection, it is interesting to note that an application for a Full Bench hearing based on importance of the objection in the public interest was refused. In an appropriate case it might be rewarding to consider whether such factors as the present encouragement given to union amalgamations; the spread of organisations, old and new, in the white collar field at all levels; the changed attitude of employers to wage demands both as to quantum and frequency of movement; the increased vertical and horizontal dependency of such movements; - call for re-evaluation of the conflict of loyalties approach or the management ethic approach" (150 CAR 950-1).

The arguments outlined in this case were adopted by Mr Commissioner Clarkson in the case which extended award coverage to supervisors in the metal trades industry. In this case the Commissioner claimed it was undesirable to stop the trend towards award coverage of award free areas. He stated

"It seems with the introduction and continued existence of awards covering professional engineers, draftsmen, production planners and technical officers, that supervisory grades are one of the last areas to be covered by an award. In my view it is not too late for the abovementioned to be reversed or halted and that in view of
the objects of the Act this is not desirable. This Commission should not be a latter
day Canute.
The management ethic facet mentioned above has not created undue problems in the
areas of employment I have just mentioned. I see no reason why supervisors should
not be entitled to the same protection and coverage of an award. It would be better
for supervisors to be covered by an award obtained by an organisation other than the
organisations) which cover the employees they supervise, and AAESDA is such an
organisation. Such an award would also cope with the conflict of loyalties mentioned
by Justice Robinson and the authorities he quoted. (194 CAR 586).

Similarly, Justice Gaudron extended award coverage to employees in high administrative and
managerial positions at the Australian National University in 1977. She claimed there was
nothing incongruous in extending an award to these employees, or that these employees
would experience a conflict of loyalty. No problem was envisaged in these employees’
salaries being part of the same award as the employees they supervised (CCH 1978:6).
Although the federal industrial tribunals did not appear to adopt new principles regarding the
regulation of managerial employment during 1982–1987, they did make decisions which
influenced the character of managerial work.

State tribunals

In 1987 a decision in the the Victorian Commission’s Commercial Clerks Board extended
access to middle and senior managers through a paid agent instead of an union. The
Chairman of the Board, Chairperson Luckman, decided these managerial employees were
entitled to representation before the Board, even though there were no special award
provisions governing these employees. He claimed to deny such access was a denial of natural
justice, and important when there were a “growing number of dismissal cases involving middle
to senior managers”. In a case involving the dismissal of a manager who refused a transfer to
Sydney, Chairperson Luckman granted the manager the right to be represented by a paid
agent (Workforce, Issue no. 657, 25 September 1987).

DISCUSSION

During the 1970’s the tribunals acknowledged the issue of ‘divided loyalties’ was not a barrier
to managers being union members, and reassessed the notion that it was a managerial
 prerogative to determine the employment conditions and salaries of managers. They
acknowledged managers had not been given the same industrial rights as other employees.

However, despite this change in attitude, the tribunals did not become more actively involved
in the regulation of managerial employment during the 1980’s. They had (through the
Industrial Registrar), however, allowed the registration of a number of trade unions to which
managerial employees could belong. The Registrar generally preferred to registrar these
unions than have their members unrepresented in the industrial relations arena, claiming the
importance of the principle of freedom of association. The next section examines the nature of
these trade unions, why they were formed and permitted to be registered by the tribunals
and briefly examines their activities during the 1980’s.

TRADE UNIONS

Trade unions permitted to cover managers took a variety of forms. They had five types of
coverage: salaried employees in particular industries, in–house salaried employees,
professional employees, particular managerial occupations and professional associations which
had extended their activities to include industrial activities. However, no matter what their
coverage, these trade unions generally conformed to the association model of trade unions
and members appeared to have little commitment to the wider union movement. In addition
to these unions a union designed to cover middle managers was also formed, but not
registered in the early 1980’s.
During the 1980's the character of some of these trade unions changed. The leaders of some trade unions had developed formal relationships with the wider trade union movement, while other unions became less closely allied to the employer. In addition, one trade union which covered only managers sought registration. However, despite these changes trade unions played a limited role in administering allocative and wage structures for managers. These unions had, however, not attempted to increase membership rates among managers or pursue matters which might be of special interest to managers. Instead, in a number of instances, the officials of the unions had made decisions which were unpopular with their managerial members. This was the result of many factors including the structure of the trade unions, the attitudes of the union officials towards their managerial members and the attitudes and expectations of the managers.

Trade unions had the potential to provide managerial employees with protection from unfair treatment, such as unfair dismissal as well as provide improvements in working conditions. They were not directly involved in the determination of managerial salaries or in allocating managers to positions through preference clauses or being represented on selection committees.

The formation of trade unions covering managers

The federal industrial arbitration legislation and the diversity of career paths and starting occupations for managers influenced the form trade unions with coverage of managers took. In the private sector there were six forms of unions: first, unions which covered salaried employees in a particular industry eg shipping, banking, insurance, and colliery staff; second, in–house unions which covered salaried employees eg AMPSSA, CBOA and CSROA; third, unions covering professional employees eg scientists, engineers; fourth, unions covering particular managerial occupations eg theatre managers, club managers; fifth, professional associations which have extended their activities to include industrial matters ie the AMA; sixth, a union covering managers in general ie the IMMA.

In general these unions were formed for one of two reasons. First, either as a defensive action in response to either another union seeking coverage of a particular group of employees or second, as an attempt to protect a group of employees' industrial and relative economic interests. Most of the unions covering salaried employees in an industry, professional employees and salaried employees in one organisation were formed as a response to the another union seeking coverage. In comparison unions covering salaried employees in the banking and insurance industries, a particular managerial occupation, the managerial occupation in general, and the assumption by some professional bodies of industrial activities were formed in response to perceived threats to the economic interests of their members.

By permitting registration of most of these organisations the Industrial Registrar was seeking to fulfil an objective of the Conciliation and Arbitration Act which was to encourage the formation and registration of organisations representing employees. The Registrar found in most instances the members of the applicant organisation did not 'conveniently belong to another registered organisation', or in circumstances where an existing union existed, the members would not join these existing unions.

Protection of relative economic position

Managerial employees in the banking and insurance industries, professional employees in medicine, and managers in a range of industries undertook industrial activities in an attempt to protect their relative economic position. The timing of these activities varied, with managers in the banking and insurance industries taking action in the 1920's and the other two groups taking action much later in the 1970's and 1980's. Not all these organisations were registered; only the organisations in the banking and insurance industry were registered.

The various sets of industrial legislation stimulated union formation and growth in the early part of the twentieth century. In a climate in which unions were regarded as legitimate and protected by legislation, some employees in the banking and insurance industry formed trade
unions in the years following the first world war. Although, a major impetus for the formation of these unions was the decline in real and relative wages of staff, especially managers, one of the problems bank unions faced was recruiting members, particularly managers (Hill 1982: 11-20). The Australian Bank Officers’ Association (ABOA), later to be known as the Australian Bank Employees Union (ABEU) was registered in 1919, while the Australian Insurance Staffs’ Federation (AISF), later to be known as the Australian Insurance Employees Union (AIEU) was registered in 1920. One of the protagonists for the formation of the ABOA, Sydney Smith, formed the Commonwealth Bank branch of the UBOA of NSW as part of his “plans for expansion of his union empire” (Hill 1982: 40), and this organisation gained registration in October 1921. Later, in 1930, this organisation was renamed the Commonwealth Bank Officers’ Association (CBOA) (Griffin, 1985:122).

The Australian Medical Association (AMA) was a professional association in the private sector which also represented some of its members industrial relations interests. The objects of the AMA allowed it do this by stating one of its purposes was “to promote the medical and allied sciences and to promote, maintain and extend the honour and interests of the medical profession.” (Memorandum of Association 1984:4). The general nature of this object allowed the AMA to provide a variety of industrial functions; representing both its members who were employers and employees. The branches in Victoria and Western Australia performed both these functions simultaneously. In New South Wales the Association was registered as a trade union of employers and as such, provided industrial services to its members (principally those in private practice). In this capacity it was a member of the Employers’ Association, but the AMA in New South Wales was not active in the employer field. However, at the same time it also represented the industrial interests of its salaried members by acting as an agent for five small registered medical associations (Noonan 1985:32). The policies of the AMA were similar to those of other organisations representing their members industrial relations interests: expressing concern for providing salaried medical practitioners with career structures, portability of entitlements, adequate training for after hours work and preference for their members (Policies of the Australian Medical Association and Directory for 1987-1988:32-33). However, its role in also providing industrial services to its members who were employers, and its role in furthering the professional interests of its members made it unlike other organisations providing industrial relations services.

In 1983 the Institute of Middle Managers of Australia (IMMA) was formed by the General Secretary of the Foremen and Supervisors Association, John Grant. He was insensed by the poor treatment managers, foremen and supervisors were getting in the brewing, metaliferrous mining and steel industries. He was particularly concerned by their treatment with regard to redundancy arrangements and pay relativities and began the process of union formation in 1981. Grant, a lawyer, drafted the Constitution and Rules for the union and encouraged members of the Foremen and Supervisors Association to join as members. In 1983 he lodged the application for registration with the Industrial Registry.

The application for registration was unsuccessful. Seventy seven organisations, both employee and employer, objected to its registration on a number of grounds. The grounds for these objections fell into five categories. The objects claimed the IMMA was first, not an association capable of registration; second, did not comply with prescribed conditions of the Act; third, members could “conveniently belong” to an already registered organisation; fourth, its registration was against the interests of industrial peace; and fifth, the description of the industry in the rules was vague and uncertain (R No 195 of 1983). Following three hearings before Mr J D McMahon, in December 1983, February and April 1984, the matter lapsed as a result of Grant’s failure to discuss the registration with the objecting organisations. The IMMA was really only ever a paper organisation and the brain child of one man, Grant and he was not prepared to follow the matter through.

Defensive reaction

A second reason for the formation of organisations to cover managers involved a reaction to the activities of other, already registered organisations. The threat of compulsory unionism
and the activities of the Federated Clerks Union (FCU) and the Association of Architects, Engineers, Surveyors and Draughtsmen (AAESDA) in the 1940's were major reasons for a number of associations seeking registration during this decade. Two in-house associations, the CSR Professional and Clerical Officers' Association (later to become the CSR Officers' Association, CSROA) and AMPSSA were registered during the 1940's. So too were unions covering salaried employees in the shipping industry (ASOA) and the coal industry (ACSA), and an association covering engineers (APEA).

The reasons the Industrial Registrars gave for granting registration differed in all cases, although in most instances they acknowledged members of the applicant organisation would remain unrepresented if their association was not registered. In the case of the CSROA Mr D. Thomson, Deputy Industrial Registrar, allowed registration on 2/2/42 on the grounds that "... the majority, if not all of the members ... will at some time or other, have to exercise control over employees of the company for which they are employed... (and)...the Court of several occasions has indicated it is undesirable that employees who have to superintend the work of other employees, and who may have to discipline the other employees, should be in the same organisation as the employees who they may have to discipline ... (In addition the) objecting trade union does not cater for professional officers, specialised or general clerks within the five states" (Decision).

Similarly, the Industrial Registrar, Mr M Stewart, supported the registration of the ASOA because not all the members of this association would be covered by the objecting organisation, the FCU. In addition he noted

"that if registration be refused the majority of those comprising the applicant would elect to remain unrepresented in any organisation; that it is preferable to duplicate to some extent some of the activities of the applicant and the objector respectively rather than to continue the lack of representation just mentioned" (Decision, 27/1/42: 3).

Registration of the ACSA was granted for different reasons. The organisation of employees in the coal industry was traditionally on an industry basis, not a craft basis. Consequently, the Industrial Registrar, Mr D. V. Morrison, approved registration "mainly because of the principles enunciated by Beeby J in the Colliery Mechanics case. In the colliery mining industry, there have been separate organisations functioning harmoniously for many years ... this is an application to cater for those who have been left out" (Decision, 23/3/1945: 25).

Unlike the in-house CBOA, the Australian Mutual Provident Society Staff Association (AMPSSA), was established as an in-house friendly society in the Australian Mutual Provident Society (AMP) in 1920, and was supported by the employer. It did not seek registration under the Conciliation and Arbitration Act until 1941, when it felt threatened by the propaganda regarding the extension of compulsory unionism, and the movement by the Australian Insurance Staffs Association to incorporate AMP Industrial Department Federation (Short History of AMPSSA n/d: 3-4). Although the Industrial Registrar, Mr M. Stewart, refused the application because the members of the applicant association could conveniently belong to other registered organisations, he did note AMP staff had failed to join this organisation. He said

"Much of the work of the employees falls into common categories. That being so it would be necessary for the applicant in order to succeed to establish that membership in an already registered organisation would not afford adequate protection for purposes of the Act. Here it is not suggested that there exists the hostility that was found in the National Union of Railwaymen's case... (the employees of AMP) have shown a continuing disinclination to join either of the objecting organisations. The basis of the inclination...from a belief in the superiority of the Society by which they are employed and consequently in their attainments and the importance of their respective vocations. The employer Society, apparently, has been nothing loth (sic) to foster this belief and the next step has been an assumption in the employees that if they can procure registration and isolate the society from other employees it will be to their material advantage" (The Decision, 23 August 1943: 3).
However, he did state that it was better to have more than one organisation registered in circumstances where members of an applicant organisation would not join an existing organisation. He said

"The guiding principles— the Act recognises the freedom of Association and the right of an Association to become an organisation ... If there is any real possibility based on sound expectations that the organisation will not represent the members of the Association then it is undesirable to refuse to register because it is better to have more than one organisation than to have a large number of employees unregistered" (ibid:19).

This principle was the one which was used ultimately to justify registration by C.J. Piper of the High Court on 22 December 1944. Following eight hearings during 1943 and 1944, and two interim judgements, C.J. Piper concluded

"that the AMP Society requires certain examinations to be passed during employment and takes this and other factors into account when fixing and reviewing salaries and that it pays higher salaries because of such factors; that any officer who does not qualify for such higher salaries is liable to be dismissed; that practically all male officers do so qualify; that the average salaries do (which include the merit increases) paid by the society are always higher than the current award minima; and that the scale of merit payments over and above the award minima can be altered by the Society from time to time to the prejudice of the employee not withstanding that it remains compulsory on him to require the merit..

I have also come to the conclusion, as stated above on the evidence before me, that the Federation has by its present attitude throughout these proceedings and in relation to this application dissented itself to presenting the claims of the Association to the Court as I think it would conflict with its view that its members generally perform their duties under sufficiently similar conditions of employment and merit the same minimum salaries as the employees of the AMP Society."

(Decision 22 December 1944: 7).

Another association, the Association of Professional Engineers (APEA), sought registration in the 1940's as a defense against another organisation, (AAESDA) seeking coverage of their members. The Industrial Registrar, Mr J Taylor, allowed registration claiming the professional engineers could not 'conveniently belong' to any existing organisation because they

"would comprise a minority in the organisation; the organisations have not advanced the contention of the engineers that special consideration should be given to them, particularly in relation to the demand that academic qualifications should be essential and that persons so qualified should receive remuneration greater than persons not so qualified; there is a fundamental cleavage in policy between applicant organisation and AAESDA because AAESDA pursue a policy of obtaining payment for work done irrespective of the academic qualification, while APEA pursue a policy of obtaining higher remuneration for engineers with qualifications; many persons would remain industrially unrepresented as there is a group of professional engineers considerable in number who would in any circumstances, refuse to join the objecting organisation (Decision, 10/11/1948, 4–5, 15–16).

Two associations, the Association of Professional Scientists of Australia (APSA) and the Secretaries and Club Managers, were registered in the 1960's. As in the case of the engineers, the AAESDA was seeking coverage of the members of APSA. Similarly, the Industrial Registrar, Mr A. E. O'Brien, registered the APSA for the same reasons that registration of the APEA was granted. He adopted the approach enunciated in this case (73 CAR, 134), stating he believed

"the members of the Association have shown they share a community of industrial interest that flows from the pursuit of a common vocation based upon training, academic qualifications and professions; that this community of interest could be destroyed or weakened or not adequately advanced if the members found themselves swallowed up in the larger membership of another registered body; and that the interests would be in danger of being submerged, neglected or not given sufficient
attention by the existing organisations because of the numerical weakness in which members of the association would find themselves if they were forced to join the already registered organisations. I am of the opinion that if the Application be refused many of the members of the Association would elect to remain unrepresented and in such circumstances it would appear that the objects of the Act would not be achieved. I am of the opinion that the members of the Association should be free to have an organisation which caters solely and exclusively for scientists so that in this rapidly developing scientific field they will be enabled to safeguard and further the interests of persons engaged herein...” (Decision, 20/11/1962;: 15–18).

Coverage of managers

Managerial employees were eligible to join almost all these organisations from the time of registration, however, they were unable to join AMPSSA until 1977. The union rules specifically forbade "persons holding executive positions in the Society" being members. However, in 1977 the association successfully argued for the deletion of this clause. It argued there was a strong common interest among all employees in the AMP, executives benefitted from the activities of the association without having any input, their expertise was lost to the association once they were promoted, there was no conflict of interest for most executives because very few have direct authority in the areas in which the staff association is involved, and that the authority of many executives had declined since the association was registered (Application for Consent to Change of the Conditions of Eligibility for membership of an Association, 17/5/1977: 2–4). There was, however, opposition among some executives to the deletion of the clause, and in 1975 an AMP Executive Officers’ Association was formed to represent the interests of the executive officers "having regard to the interests of the Society” (AMP Executive Officers’ Association, Constitution, 3/2/1975). This association finally decided not to seek registration in 1977 because of lack of support from its members (Memo from Executive Officers’ Association Federal Secretary, P. Smith 14/6/1977). It was finally disbanded in August 1977 following the deletion of the restrictive clause from the rules and discussions with the AMP’s Personnel Manager who claimed the boundary between award and non–award matters was becoming increasingly blurred and a preference for dealing with one association (Memo to Executive Officers, 10/8/1977).

TRADE UNION CHARACTERS

Although Arthurs claims union character is not a precise concept (1977, cited in Frost in Poole and Mansfield 1980:122), organisations representing employees’ industrial interests can be classified to distinguish their similarities and differences. A range of methods have been used to classify trade unions according to their similarities and differences. Classifications have been made according to membership and union behaviour. Classifications according to membership produce first, the white collar/ blue collar dichotomy in which managers are included in the white collar group (Martin 1980; Bain 1970; Sturmfhal 1966; Kleingartner 1968; Bain, Coates and Ellis 1973), or second, trade unions covering managers and professionals have been conceptualised as a third distinct group within British and European industrial relations (Snape and Bamber 1987:43; Weir 1976; FIET 1987). Australian unions have not been conceptualised in this way yet.

Union behaviour

Classifications according to union behaviour have been made first, in terms of the extent to which unions are pragmatic and defensive or radical–political organisations and second, in terms of the unions character expressed through its policies and associations. Writers who have developed the first classification are Poole (1981: 6–19) who develops the five categories of unions as moral, revolutionary, pragmatic, democratic, and subject to the fluctuations of the economy using mostly British and American studies; and Hagan (1981), Howard (1980) and Martin (1980) who have described Australian unions in terms of their pragmatic or radical behaviour in Australia. Australian unions are generally regarded as conforming to the pragmatic, defensive model (Deery 1983: 60–92; Dabscheck and Niland 1981: 141–142;
Howard 1980, 78-99). Hagan (1981: 441-54) explains this pragmatic approach in terms of the union's commitment to arbitration, the Australian Labour Party (ALP), and desire for a protectionist government and labels it a 'labourist' tradition. The other tradition evident among Australian unions is described as the 'revolutionary' tradition which is marked by union activities to replace the arbitration system with socialism.

The second way of categorising union behaviour has been labelled 'unionateness'. The degree of 'unionateness' is described in terms of the union's commitment to the general principles and ideology of the trade union movement as expressed through its policy and objectives, its structure, whether it is registered, its association with the wider trade union movement, affiliation with political parties and its willingness to take strike action (Blackburn 1967; Prandy 1965; Lockwood 1958). This method facilitates the inclusion of professional organisations who undertake industrial activities, but may not be registered. This has been important for the analysis of British organisations representing managerial industrial interests because some professional bodies, whose primary aims are to uphold professional standards and provide training, have pursued the industrial interests of their members (EAPM 1979; Bamber 1986:10). However, it is of lesser importance in Australia, where in the private sector the AMA appears to be the only professional body which undertakes any industrial activities.

A Third Force?

Unions covering managerial employees do not constitute a 'third force' in Australian industrial relations. Although a number of unions covering professional employees, many of whom have managerial or supervisory responsibilities, are affiliated to a specialist peak organisation and most of the unions identified above displayed characteristics which placed them at the association end of the trade union-association continuum, these unions did not represent a coherent bloc in Australian industrial relations in the way the Managerial Professional and Staff Liaison Group (MPG) might be considered in Britain or the Swedish Confederation of Professional Associations in Sweden or the General Confederation of Professional and Managerial Staffs in France (Gospel 1978: 360-2). Although in Australia the peak organisation, the Australian Council of Professional Associations (ACPA), does have standing at national wage cases, its affiliates include only a small number of the trade unions covering managerial employees and it plays a limited role in the formation of national economic policies.

Affiliates to the ACPA include the APEA, APSA, the Commonwealth Medical Officers' Association, the Commonwealth Professional Surveyors' Association, CSIRO Officers' Association, Repatriation Department Medical Officers Association, Australian International Flight Simulator Instructors Association and Australian International Pilots Association (Constitution and Rules of ACPA 1987:1) but did not include in-house trade unions, unions covering salaried employees, unions covering specialist managers or the AMA. The organisation began in the early 1950's as a loose knit consultative body of registered industrial organisations (known as the Council of Professional Associations (CPA)) with the aim of improving the conditions of professional employees (no author Council of Professional Associations, n/d: 1-2). During the 1980's CPA (renamed the ACPA in 1985 because CPA was confused with other organisations) sought to maintain and advance the status of its members by correcting the compression of salaries experienced by its members (Submission to the Remuneration Tribunal Anomalies Conference Re Parliamentary Salaries:1). It opposed the claims for a flat rate increase in wages and salaries in national wage cases and at a Conference held on 9 October 1987 to discuss wage and salary increases following the March 1987 national wage case, applied for a 1.5% increase for its affiliate members (National Wage Case December 1987, Dec 800/87 M Print HO100:2).

Despite its appearances in the national wage cases, the ACPA was only given observer status following the second round of invitations at the economic and tax summits in the early 1980's. The association did not intervene with the rights of individual organisations and since
1957 has been dominated by the APEA. The APEA provides Secretariat services and leadership in policy because it is the only union among the affiliates which has the resources.

White collar or blue collar organisations?

The unions covering managerial employees therefore do not constitute a third force in Australian industrial relations. However, they do appear to fit into the white collar classification of the white collar/blue collar categorisation because none of the organisations cover employees performing manual work. The APEA and APSA require their members have qualifications, and prefer degree qualifications not certificates. One union which could fit into the blue collar category covers supervisors rather than managers. This union, ADSTE, formerly AAESA, covers supervisors and some professional staff. Unlike APEA and APSA it places no emphasis on formal qualifications for members.

THE EXTENT OF UNIONATENESS

The unions covering managerial employees display characteristics which set them apart from many other trade unions. As Table 1 indicates, all of these unions except the AMA and the IMMA were registered, and all of them were pragmatic, with managerial members having limited commitment to the wider political and industrial affiliations of trade unions.

Affiliations

In instances when the trade union was affiliated to the Australian Council of Trade Unions (ACTU), the officials overcame resistance from the membership by either an executive decision, an aggressive campaign or a rule change. For instance, following the ABEU losing a plebiscite to affiliate with the ACTU in 1979, Federal Conference made a decision to affiliate (Interview with P. Marchioni, 12/10/1987), while in the AIEU affiliation only occurred in 1979 after a "sustained campaign to bring it about" (45th Biennial Conference of the Federal Council, ACTU:1). The ASOA had tried to affiliate with the ACTU for a number of years but had encountered membership resistance. In order to enable affiliation, a rule change was made, with the result that the decision could be made by the Executive of 18 members (Interview, P. Cooper, 1/10/1987).

The APEA applied for affiliation to the ACTU in 1989 after a group membership plebiscite. Union officials believed affiliation was essential following the introduction of the "Structural and Efficiency" Principle, because it allowed greater scope for the protection of their members interests during negotiations under this principle (Interview, D. Jeffrey, 7/2/1990).

None of the organisations were affiliated to the ALP. In all circumstances the officials claimed the members wanted the union to be either a-political or in the cases of the ASOA and the ACSA some desired affiliation with the Liberal or Country Parties. The ASOA fulltime officials would have liked affiliation with the ALP because it was believed this would have given them "better access to the Minister" (Interview P. Cooper, 1/10/1987). In the ABUS the Federal Conference of 1986 noted it believed it was "right, proper and critical for all trade unions to play an active role in the political wing of the Australian Labour Party, but noted substantial numbers of members remain opposed for a variety of reasons ... Federal Executive is requested to continue improving informal liaison with the Australian Labour Party to promote ABUS views at that level, and Divisions are requested to continue education and debate on this question" (ABUS Policy March 1986).

Strike action

All the unions opposed strike action and saw it as a method of last resort. In the unions which covered salaried employees in particular industries there had been instances of strike action. The ABUS was involved in ouvert industrial action in the late 1960's and early 1970's (Griffin 1985:58-106, 150-154), while in 1981 members of the ASOA in Queensland went on
strike for a few days over a salary increase (Interview, P. Cooper, 1/10/1987). Strikes by the members of the ACSA are relatively unknown, and this is particularly the case among division A staff which includes managers and professional employees. The last strike was held in 1986 at the Elcom collieries and lasted for a week (Interview, R. Dash, 19/10/1987). AMPSSA policy recognised the members’ right to strike, but stated it was a method of last resort (Policy 1984:4–5). It had been used twice; first, in 1978 about housing loan arrangements and again, in 1980/81 about work value. J. Biddington, Federal Secretary of AMPSSA, believed the younger members of the union were more cynical of the AMP’s culture of appealing to their hopes for promotion and a career, and as a result more prepared to strike (J. Biddington, interview, 23/11/1987). However, despite this belief, the rules of the organisation identified the first objective as “Harmonise conflicting interests of employer and employee” (Rules 1986:2).

Unlike these unions, the CSROA didn’t support strike action at all, believing there were other avenues for settling grievances. This was expressed in the rules of the organisation as an object “to promote industrial peace and efficiency and to endeavour by all lawful means to prevent or settle any industrial disputes, lockouts or strikes affecting members” (CSR Ltd Officers’ Association Rules 1986:7). The organisation had an unitary philosophy which promoted the belief grievances could be solved through better communications. The executive and the officials believed this was the way 99% of the members felt too (F. Badstock, interview, 19/11/1987).

Nature of policies

The policies of the trade unions as expressed in either their formal policies adopted at Conference or, in circumstances where this did not occur, developed by the Executive, indicated a primary concern for protecting and improving their members industrial interests. These interests often explicitly recognised the employer as a career employer and included policies which would enhance the career prospects for their members. In most instances there was little concern for broader social or moral issues, the ABEU and the AIEU being the exceptions.

Policies which recognised the career nature of the union members work included provisions for the progressive advancement of members through a series of grades (ASOA Office Representative’s Handbook, ASOA:10, Some Policies and Objectives Adopted at the Association’s Federal Conference), limiting entry level and retrenchments (ABEU Policy March 1986), opposing outside appointments to higher levels and recognising the employers’ personnel philosophy was that of a career organisation (AMPSSA Policy Statements 1987:7), the provision of adequate training and planning by the employer (ibid, ASOA op cit, ibid), and the provision of career structures (APEA).

Relationship with employer

The nature of the union–employer relationship varied. In some instances the employers grudgingly accepted the union while in another, the union would not have existed without the employer’s support. As Table 1 demonstrates in most cases, the exceptions being three in-house unions, the trade unions were independent from the employer and grudgingly accepted. In the other three cases the nature of the relationship with the employer varied. In these instances the employer provided infrastructure support, such as the provision of office accommodation, employees on secondment and arrangements to accommodate superannuation payments. The most ‘dependent relationship’ occurred in the case of the CSROA in which it was stated the association could only survive with the support of the employer. Without its support, many of its members would be poached by other unions (Senior executive, interview, 3/9/1987).
Managers perceptions of their unions

Managers appeared to view the unions to which they belonged in different ways. In some circumstances it was believed the managers did not view the organisation as an union, but rather as association. In other circumstances, the union was viewed as an industrial-political organisation. Officials of the ASOA and the CSROA claimed their members considered the union an association not a trade union. They felt many of their members believed the organisation was concerned with furthering their career prospects and a source of protection in the event of a dispute with a more senior manager. In other unions, where the managers understood the industrial nature of the organisation, many did not want the employers to know they were members of the union. In these circumstances, ABEU, CBOA and the ASOA mail concerning the union was sent to the managers home address rather than to the office.

Commitment to arbitration

The policies of the unions demonstrated the organisations conformed to the dominant pattern among Australian unions of being pragmatic rather than revolutionary. However, they donot conform to the 'labourist' tradition identified by Hagan; not displaying a commitment to the ALP, a desire for a protectionist government, and in some circumstances little commitment to arbitration. Not until 1986 did the CBOA secure an award. Until this time, the CBOA had relied on negotiating increases under its agreement with the Commonwealth Banking Corporation.

"For decades before the parties came to the Commission, salaries of Corporation officers had been adjusted from time to time by negotiation and consensus, this being in accordance with terms of an agreement going back to the 1920's (Commonwealth Banking Corporation Staff (Salaries) Award, 1986 (A260 10/9/1986). Even with the introduction of the award, managerial salaries were still award free and determined by the Corporation (Circular No 8187, Circular No 4083 of 1986).

RECENT CHANGES

Registered unions which covered managers did not seek to extend their coverage of managers or develop policies specifically for them between 1982 and 1987. Some unions which had coverage of managerial employees did take preliminary steps necessary for the restructuring of their organisations, however, this was rare. Similarly, unions did not seek to extend their coverage of managers, and in one instance where coverage was extended it was to non-managerial employees. Generally, unions seemed disinterested in protecting the interests of their managerial members, and in some circumstances, even quite hostile.

Closer formal relationships with the trade union movement

Closer relationships with the trade union movement occurred in two ways during the 1980's: first, formal affiliations were entered into with peak union organisations; and second, closer relationships were developed with other unions in the industry. As mentioned earlier, the APEA sought affiliation with the ACTU in 1989. In the finance industry a number of unions developed closer formal relationships with other union organisations in response to the deregulation of the finance industry. The ABEU and the AIEU affiliated to the International Federation of Commercial, Clerical, Professional and Technical Employees (FICET). These unions believed there was a need for international unionism because of the greater influence of trans-national corporations on industrial relations practices. The reasons for this affiliation were expressed by the AIEU in the following way:

"The need for international trade unionism has increased with the growth of trans-national corporations and with national economies becoming subject to greater influence by the international economy...

It is important for Australian unions to be aware of industrial relations strategies adopted in other countries that might impact upon our members. It is equally
important that AIEU contributes to unions in other countries by sharing our own experiences..."  

The other way closer relationships with other unions were developed was through the formation of working parties. Once again, this occurred in the finance industry, where the AIEU and the ABEU formed an amalgamation working party in 1986. As a result a firm of solicitors, Maurice Blackburn & Co., drafted rules based on the Textile Union model. These rules were regarded as only "a first step towards a more permanent structure" (44th Biennial Conference AIEU Federal Council 1985: 75). Similarly, the APEA and the APSA undertook steps towards amalgamation.

Focus of union activities

Another change which occurred in the finance industry involved the focus of CBOA activities. Until the 1980's the primary focus and basis for comparison for the formulation of claims had been the Australian Public Service, however, deregulation encouraged the focus to change to the finance industry. During this period the employer, the Commonwealth Banking Corporation, only considered union claims in terms of their relationship to the finance industry, and was not amenable to other arguments (P. Riordan, interview, 5/5/1987).

Extending coverage

In all instances the union was not interested in extending their coverage of managers by recruiting greater numbers of them or in developing policies to deal with their concerns. In one instance, it was stated the union was not concerned with the special interests of managers because they were the privileged section of the union (union official, interview, 12/10/1987). The only exception occurred in the CBOA where in 1980 a manager's subcommittee was formed in NSW. These managers felt their interests and problems were not adequately being dealt with by the union (P. Riordan, interview, 5/5/1987).

The one exception where a union sought to extend coverage concerned the ASOA. In 1981 it sought to extend coverage to include travel agents. It was successful in securing a change in its eligibility rule to include employees who work in a travel agency or travel department of an employer with other business interests and who are not eligible for membership in any existing registered organisation limiting its membership solely to those employed in the shipping industry (R Nos 55 and 56 of 1983:1). The union was successful in securing a change in its eligibility rule and a subsequent name change to the Australian Shipping and Travel Officers' Association (ASTOA).

DISCUSSION

Organisations representing the industrial interests of managerial employees take a variety of forms. In terms of Snape and Bamber's typology of four union types (1989:95), Figure 1 indicates most unions covering managers in Australia conform to the fourth type of union, described as 'open' unions. They display the two characteristics associated with this type: first, covering a range of employees other than just managers and professionals, and second, dealing with more than one employer. Greater insight into the characteristics of unions covering managers in Australia can be gained by extending Snape and Bamber's typology to recognise the differences in the scope of union coverage. As Figure 1 shows 'open' unions can be classified into three groups: those covering salaried employees in a particular industry, those covering a particular professional group and finally, professional associations which have extended their activities to include industrial activities. In addition, registered unions which consisted of only managers had narrow coverage ie they covered managers in a particular managerial occupation in a particular industry.
When the characteristic of 'unionateness' is considered as a continuum, unions covering managers are located at the end of low 'unionateness'. Although there is diversity in the characteristics of these unions, the members of these unions appear to have little commitment to the wider political and industrial role of trade unions. Bamber's comments of managers in the United Kingdom are equally applicable to Australian managers: "Managers tend to suspect the class and political connotations of trade unions and the TUC (ACTU)" (Bamber 1976:38). These organisations, in the main, did not support strike activity, were independent of the employer, had narrow industrial policies and no affiliations with political parties.

There were, however, differences in officials' and members' views about the appropriate activities and affiliations for their union. This was most evident regarding affiliations to the ACTU and the ALP. During the 1980's some unions developed closer relationships with the trade union movement, but this was only possible after officials in most circumstances took unilateral action.

There was no evidence to indicate trade unions covering managers were seeking to extend their coverage of managerial employees or develop policies which were of special concern to managers. The unsuccessful attempt of the IMMA to gain registration meant the interests of managers continued to be represented through organisations in which the majority of members were non-managers.

The above examination casts doubt on Bamber's (1985:66) claim that "...managers' unionism may also grow there (in Australia)". There appeared to be little interest on the part of the unions, or the managers, to either increase union density rates among managers, or to join unions in greater numbers. In addition, conditions for union growth were not favourable during the first half of the 1980's. Union bargaining power was undermined, union resources remained inadequate and union public image was poor (Davis 1987:292–3).

CONCLUSION

The state through legislation and tribunal decisions played a contradictory role by, on one hand encouraging trade union formation, but restricting the ability of unions to extend awards to managers. Growth in the managerial workforce and changing social conventions about the relationship between employers and their managerial employees caused the institutions of the state to review their approach to extent to which tribunals and trade unions could be involved in the determination of salaries and conditions for managerial employees.

Trade unions covering managers did not play a major role in the formulation of managerial salaries and working conditions. Those unions with coverage of managers could not be understood in terms of either the 'labourist' or 'revolutionary' tradition, but their behaviour was characterised by low levels of 'unionateness'. Although their 'unionateness' was low, these unions did not constitute a separate 'third force' in the labour market and nor could they be regarded as professional associations.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIONS</th>
<th>Registered in Federal jurisdiction</th>
<th>Associations with wider T.U. movement</th>
<th>Affiliations with Political Parties</th>
<th>Strike Action</th>
<th>Independence from Employer</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Salaried Employees</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ABEU</td>
<td>1919</td>
<td>ACTU (1981)</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>last resort</td>
<td>independent, grudging</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>in the past</td>
<td>acceptance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>limited</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>acceptance</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIEU</td>
<td>1920</td>
<td>ACTU, FIET</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>last resort</td>
<td>independent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASOA</td>
<td>1942</td>
<td>ACTU (1984)</td>
<td>No, many members in favour</td>
<td>last resort</td>
<td>independent, but close</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>working relationship</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>independent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACSA</td>
<td>1945</td>
<td>ACTU (1976)</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>last resort</td>
<td>independent</td>
</tr>
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<td><strong>In-house</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBOA</td>
<td>1921</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>last resort</td>
<td>support being withdrawn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMPSSA</td>
<td>1941</td>
<td>(ACTU, 1989)</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>last resort</td>
<td>support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSROA</td>
<td>1942</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Never</td>
<td>support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Professional</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APEA</td>
<td>1948</td>
<td>ACPA, (ACTU, 1989)</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>last resort</td>
<td>independent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APSA</td>
<td>1962</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>independent</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Entertainment</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
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<td>Theatre</td>
<td>1946</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>independent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Club</td>
<td>1961</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>independent</td>
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<tr>
<td>IDMA</td>
<td>Sought 1983 but lapsed</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
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<tr>
<td>ANA</td>
<td>registered in States</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>last resort</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** Interviews Trade Union Officials
FIGURE 1

TYPES OF TRADE UNIONS

Exclusively Managerial and Professional Membership

1) 'closed' unions

Deals with only one employer

2) staff associations

AMPSSA
CSROA
CBOA

3) multi-employer managers' unions

i) 'operational' managers
Theatres
Clubs

ii) unregistered union
IMMA

Deals with many employers

4) 'open' unions

i) salaried employees in an

ABEU
AIEU
ASOA
ACSA

ii) professional employees

APEA
APSA

iii) professional association

AMA

Not-exclusive to managers and professionals
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